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I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated
auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I
construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payo
larger than the bid rotation payo.
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1 Introduction
Repeated interaction among the same bidders in a sequence of auctions is a common
occurrence. A regular group of buyers attend Sotheby's auctions, the same rms com-
pete for government defense contracts regularly, automobile dealers meet in vehicle
auctions time and again, and so on (see Nelson [12] and Philips et al. [13]). Such
environments create fertile ground for collusion, because in a repeated game reputa-
tion can be built, implicit transfers can be made, and noncooperative players can be
punished. Apart from being a prevalent empirical phenomenon, collusion in auctions
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1is an instance of a much broader class of problems, as it exhibits the dening fea-
tures of any repeated adverse selection game. This class includes repeated oligopoly
games, social insurance games, and more. For example, Bertrand competition with
independent draws of constant marginal costs is strategically equivalent to a rst-
price auction with independent and private values (take the negative of the cost to
be the \valuation" and the negative of the price to be the \bid").
One of the very rst questions that arises naturally is what is the scope of possible
collusion? That is, what equilibrium payos can be achieved in the repeated game
above the competitive payo, and what are the strategies delivering these payos?
This question has been addressed under a variety of assumptions (see the literature
review in subsection 1.1 below). In this paper I consider the 2-bidder independent
private values (IPV) case, under the assumption that there is no public correlation
device, and the bidders can neither exchange money nor communicate|all they can
do, in any given round, is simply to bid in the stage auction (or refrain from bidding).
This is an important environment to study, because communication is often deemed
illegal by anti-trust law. Furthermore, even in the absence of legal obstacles, the
cartel may prefer to collude tacitly, simply in order to minimize the probability of
detection by the seller.
Apart from the innite repetition of the static (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium, which
is obviously feasible, a feasible line of behavior which does not require transfers or
communication is the bid rotation scheme, which works as follows: in every odd num-
bered period bidder 1 (say) gets to be the sole participant in the auction and obtain
the good for the reserve price, and in even numbered periods bidder 2 is the sole
participant. For this scheme to be supported in equilibrium the bidders need to be
suciently patient, so that the rst designated loser will adhere to it. In addition,
eective o-equilibrium threats are needed. Such threats are assured to exist if the
bid rotation payo exceeds the static equilibrium payo, as simple Nash reversion can
be applied. In fact, this is the case with virtually all well-behaved distributions: as
2shown by McAfee and McMillan [10], the bid rotation payo exceeds the competitive
payo if the distribution of valuations exhibits an increasing hazard rate. In Lemma 2
below I derive an alternative sucient condition: it is sucient that the distribution's
expectation is at least as large as one half of the maximal valuation. Consequently,
one would like to look for schemes that improve on bid rotation. Several such schemes
have been derived in the literature, but they suer from several drawbacks: the im-
provements are typically only in terms of ex ante payo, they vanish as the discount
factor tends to one, and some of the schemes involve extremely asymmetric play on
the path, where one player receives a very low payo (see subsection 1.1 for details).
I demonstrate the existence of a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation (EBR, for
short), that overcomes all these drawbacks.
Under this scheme, there is a particular value , such that the period-t loser gets
to obtain the good for free in period t+1 if his valuation in t+1 is above , and the
period-t winner obtains it for free otherwise. This is achieved by endowing the last
loser with the privilege of determining the identity of the current winner. When the
stage game is a second-price auction, the following strategy implements the scheme:
the last winner is instructed to bid zero (independent of his valuation) and the last
loser is instructed to bid positively if his valuation is above  and refrain from bidding
otherwise. Deviations trigger a perpetual punishment phase. A similar construction
is presented for a general auction format. In this way, losing the current auction is
accompanied by receiving a higher expected continuation payo (relatively to win-
ning), because the last loser has the privilege of deciding on the current winner. This
intertemporal tradeo delivers the appropriate incentives, and sustains the scheme in
equilibrium.
31.1 Literature Review
It is well-known that in the IPV case the rst-best1 is achievable if the cartel can
organize side transfers. This result, which is true even for a one-shot auction, has
been shown by Graham and Marshall [7] and Mailath and Zemsky [9] for second-
price auctions, and by McAfee and McMillan [10] for symmetric rst-price auctions.
These results readily imply that with transfers the rst-best can also be achieved in a
repeated game|simply by repeating the static scheme in every round. By contrast,
when transfers are not available, there is a world of dierence between the static and
the repeated auction. As shown by McAfee and McMillan [10], the best the cartel can
do in a static auction is either to chose the winner randomly or to have its members
bid competitively. In a repeated auction, on the other hand, the rich strategy spaces
open the door for a wide range of collusive behaviors and allow for substantial collu-
sion even without monetary side-payments, because continuation payos can function
(partially, at least) as implicit transfers. In particular, it follows from the analysis of
Fudenberg et al. [6] of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, that in the
IPV case with communication, nitely many valuations, and publicly observable bids,
a folk theorem holds.2 In particular, the rst-best can be approximated as closely as
one wishes when the discount factor tends to one.
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [15] study perfect public equilibria (due to Fudenberg
et al. [6]) in repeated auctions where the identity of the winner is the only public
signal. They derive schemes that improve on competitive bidding and bid rotation,
and that do not require transfers or communication. Related results have been ob-
tained by Blume and Heidhues [5]. In both [5] and [15] \one-shot improvements" are
derived, where one takes the bid rotation scheme and introduces a certain change
1By rst-best it is meant that the payment to the seller does not exceed the reserve price and
the allocation is ecient.
2Aoyagi [2] considers a repeated auction model where bidders communicate in every round with
the aid of a central mediation device. He identies conditions under which the rst-best can be
approximated, even when valuations are not independent.
4in the rst few periods, which translates to a slight improvement in ex ante payos.
In particular, there exists a t such that for all t  t the following is true: a bid-
der's payo conditional on any t-history is not greater than the bid rotation payo.3
Consequently, this implies that the degree of the improvement converges to zero as
the discount factor tends to one. Moreover, under some of these schemes, it is the
case that conditional on some of these t-histories one of the bidders is receiving a
lower-than-bid-rotation payo.
In addition to these \one-shot improvements," Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [15]
construct two schemes that deliver nonmarginal improvements conditional on every
history of play: the exclusion scheme and the chips mechanism. The rst is similar
to EBR in the sense that there are periods, called the exclusive periods, in which one
bidder is the designated sole participant. In contrast to EBR, there are also periods,
the normal periods, in which positive bidding by both bidders takes place. Transitions
between the normal and exclusive periods are dictated by a public randomization de-
vice. The main shortcomings of this scheme are that it is not known how the bidding
functions in the normal periods look like, it does not have a public-randomization-free
analog, and it is not known whether this scheme improves on bid rotation when the
distribution of valuations is other than uniform.4
Under the chips mechanism, each bidder starts the repeated game with T chips,
and every time a bidder wins he gives one chip to his opponent. Once a bidder runs
out of chips he is instructed to let his opponent win k consecutive auctions, at the end
of which he receives one chip back. Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn evaluate this scheme
numerically, by optimizing over T and k, for the case of a second-price auction and
a uniform distribution. According to their calculations, this scheme extracts all pos-
sible collusive gains when the discount factor approaches one (earlier in their paper,
3Similar improvements can be constructed with respect to the innite repetition of the static
equilibrium.
4Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn compute the payo for the special case of a uniform distribution. As
we will see later, EBR does better than the exclusion scheme in the uniform case.
5Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn derive an anti-folk theorem for perfect public equilibria,
which establishes a bound on the cartel's payo in any such equilibrium; the payo
of the chips mechanism converges to this bound). The scheme is too complicated
for analytical analysis and it is not known what are the improvements it delivers for
distributions other than uniform. It is also not known whether it can be sustained
in equilibrium for auction formats other than second-price (because the second-price
auction has asymmetric equilibria which are necessary in the construction). Finally,
as in the case of the exclusion scheme, it is not known how the equilibrium bidding
functions look like.
Under either the chips mechanism and the exclusions scheme there are periods in
which there is no selection whatsoever: under the former, when one bidder is sup-
posed to let the other win k auctions in a row, the latter obtains the good in those
k rounds independent of any information; under the latter, the designated bidder
wins independent of any information whenever the scheme is in an exclusive period.
Under EBR, by contrast, there is always some information utilized in the selection
of the winner. Additionally, under either the chips mechanism and the exclusion
scheme there are periods in which nontrivial bidding takes place, and the seller re-
ceives positive payments; under EBR, by contrast, the payment to the seller is always
zero.
2 Model
There are two symmetric, risk-neutral, expected utility maximizing bidders, bidder 1
and bidder 2, who participate in an innite sequence of statistically independent IPV
(sealed-bid) general standard auctions with a zero reserve price. A single indivisible
object is sold in every period (there is one object per period). In a standard auction
(see Riley and Samuelson [14]), each bidder can bid any nonnegative bid, the winner is
a bidder who submitted a maximal bid, his payment to the auctioneer is nonnegative,
6and the auction rules are anonymous. First-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions
are examples of standard auctions.5 Valuations are drawn every period for each
bidder, and they are independent across periods and across bidders. Each such draw is
from the unit interval, according to the atomless, dierentiable distribution F, whose
density, f  F 0, satises f > 0.6 Whenever bidder i and bidder j are mentioned in
the same sentence, it is implicitly assumed that i 6= j. In addition to the regular bids
(i.e., nonnegative reals), a bidder can also submit a special bid, denoted 0+, which
is identical to 0 except that it wins for sure if the competing bid is 0.7 There is
no communication between the bidders, they cannot organize transfers, and they do
not have a public randomization device; all they can do is simply bid in the auction
(or abstain) in every round, as a function of the history leading to that round. The
bidders share the discount factor 0   < 1, and each bidder has a reservation utility
of zero (in every period). The seller is inactive|he does not try to detect or deter
collusion, nor does he behave in any other strategic way (alternatively, one can think
of a sequence of short-lived sellers, one for each auction). At the end of each round,
the seller publicly announces the (participation decisions and the) bids made in that
round. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
3 Endogenous bid rotation
The following collusive scheme is the main contribution of this paper:
Denition 1. The Endogenous bid rotation scheme (EBR, for short) is dened as
follows: Fix a number  2 [0;1], and pick the designated winner for period 0. This
5To economize of space, I do not dene a \standard auction" formally. I trust that this slight
informality will not cause any confusion or unclarity.
6I take the interval of types to be [0;1] just for notational simplicity. This is without loss
of generality: all the analysis in the sequel can be carried out for an arbitrary interval of types
[a;b]  R+.
7This special bid 0+ is due to Blume and Heidhues [5].
7bidder is instructed to bid 0, while his rival is instructed to refrain from bidding.
Then, in each period t+1, the period-t winner is instructed to bid 0 and the period-t
loser is instructed to bid 0+ if his valuation is at least  and refrain from bidding
otherwise.
In what follows, I will derive the equation that describes the value of this scheme for
a given  2 [0;1]. Then, I will prove that there exists a unique  2 [0;1] such that
EBR can be supported as a repeated-game equilibrium.
For a xed , let V l() be the ex ante value from starting the (t + 1)-th period
of the repeated game as the period-t loser under EBR. Similarly, let V w() be this
value for the period-t winner.8 These numbers satisfy the following equations:
V
l() = F()V
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:
8These utility numbers depend on the discount factor. I omit it from the notation for brevity.








(1   F())E(vjv  ) + F()ve
1   
]:









The intuition behind this formula is that conditional on being a last loser who choses
to win, a bidder's expected payo is E(vjv  ), and conditional on being a last
winner who is \awarded the win" by the rival it is ve. Since on average each bidder
is the last loser (and the last winner) one half of the time, the probability of the rst
event is 1
2(1   F()) and the probability of the second event is 1
2F().
Taking incentives into account, it must be that a last loser of type  is indierent





Lemma 1. For every distribution of valuations F and every discount factor  2 [0;1),
(4) has a unique solution in [0;1].
Equation (4) may have multiple solutions, depending on F and ,10 but exactly one
of them belongs to the unit interval. Denote it by ().11 This function  satises
(0) = 0, it is strictly increasing, and takes its values in [0;ve); these properties will
9This value is calculated under the assumption that ex ante each bidder has a 50% chance of
being the rst winner. Strictly speaking, this is a little problematic, because I assume no public
randomization. In any case, the identity of the rst winner is of negligeble importance for patient
bidders.
10This is the case when F is the uniform distribution and  is close to one.
11This number depends on the discount factor and on the distribution, so a more complete notation
would be (;F). Since the distribution of valuations is xed throughout the analysis, and in order
to economize on notation, I simply write ().
9be established formally in subsection 3.1.
The fact that the right hand side of (4) is positive follows from the fact that being
a last loser has a greater value, because he has the privilege of deciding on the current
winner. It is also intuitive that the dierence between these values is small (these
values themselves are huge when  is close to one), because all that \separates them"
is one period. For future reference, it is convenient to note that by equations (1) and
(2), (4) can be rewritten as:
 = 
R 1
 tf(t)dt   F()ve
1 +    2F()
: (5)
From now on, let EBR denote the scheme dened in Denition 1 for  = ().
We are now ready to turn to the rst result: supporting (a slight modication of)
EBR in a repeated-game equilibrium, in the special case where the auction format is
second-price. In this special case, the scheme can actually be sustained independent
of the discount factor.
Let c denote the competitive static payo. Namely, c is the ex ante payo for a
bidder in the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the one-shot auction.12
It is independent of the auction format as long as we restrict attention to standard
auctions; i.e., payo equivalence holds (Myerson [11]). Given a number x > 1, let
Ei(x) be the repeated-game equilibrium of the repeated second-price auction, where
bidder i bids x in every round, independent of his valuation, and bidder j bids 0 in
every round.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the auction format is second-price. Then EBR is imple-
mentable in a PBE for every discount factor  2 [0;1).
Proof. Fix an x > 1, and consider EBR, with the following slight modication: the
last loser is instructed to bid x (instead of 0+) when his valuation is at least .
12This payo is computed prior to learning one's type; i.e., denoting by c() the expected com-
petitive payo of type , c =
R
c()f()d.
10Consider the following strategy prole: bidder i is instructed to play according to
EBR as long as there is no evidence of a deviation by either bidder, in any past
period. Once a deviation occurs, the bidder who deviated rst, say j, is punished
forever as follows: Ei(x) is played forever.13 The beliefs to accompany the strategy
are obvious: a bidder believes that his opponent follows EBR as long as he does not
have evidence to the contrary; o the path, any beliefs that are consistent with own
behavior will do.14
The fact that o-path play consists of mutual best-responses is clear, so it only
left to verify on-path incentives; since the latter are obvious for a last winner,15 it only
remains to verify, that the last loser has the right incentives to follow the scheme.
Consider then bidder i, who is the last loser on the path. Obviously, there is a
cuto  2 [0;1] such that bidder i will chose to win if his valuation is above  and
he will abstain if his valuation is below . Moreover, it is straightforward that there
is such an optimal , and that bidder i's best-response instructs him to follow this
-cuto strategy, whenever he is the last loser, as long as there is no evidence of a
deviation by bidder j. Let Zl and Zw be the values for bidder i under this -strategy,





13It may be the case that no deviation has occurred up to and including round t, but once the
seller reveals the bids made in t + 1, it turns out that both bidders deviated (simultaneously) in
t+1, hence no \rst deviator" exists. In such a case, any tie breaking rule for deciding on who will
be punished will work.
14Here is an example for inconsistent beliefs: in the case where play went o the path and Ei(x)
is supposed to be played forever, and bidder i loses with the bid x, the belief that the opponent
submitted the bid zero (as he is supposed to) is inconsistent for i with his own behavior.
15The last winner does not have short-term incentives to bid more than 0 because the last loser









l + (1   F())(v
 + Z
w):
where v  E(vjv  ). Combining these equations yields

 = F()   +F() +
(1   F())v   F()ve. This equation is satised for  = ; moreover, this is the
unique solution to this equation, because the derivative (wrt ) of the LHS is 1
 > 1,
and that of the RHS is F()   1 + F()  minfF();F()g  1.
Theorem 1 applies only to the second-price format. In a general auctions setting,
extremely asymmetric equilibria are typically not available, and the EBR is imple-
mented using the special bid 0+, instead of the aforementioned modication, where
the last loser takes the good by bidding a large number x. Consequently, the last
winner needs to be provided with incentives not to \jump in and steal the good," a
credible punishment phase needs to be introduced, and a certain degree of patience
is required. The condition c  ve
2 guarantees that simple Nash reversion can be
invoked as the o-path threat; with this threat, the last winner will not \steal the
good" if he is suciently patient.
Theorem 2. Consider the general symmetric IPV repeated auction, and suppose that
c  ve
2 . Then there exists a   2 (0;1) such that EBR is implementable in a PBE
provided that  2 ( ;1).
Proof. Consider the strategy that instructs each bidder to follow EBR as long as
there has not been any deviation from it, and instructs perpetual competitive bidding
once a deviation has occurred. Since the EBR payo exceeds ve
2 , which, in turn, is
greater than the expected competitive payo c, it follows that when the bidders are
suciently patient noone will want to make a detectable deviation. Consequently,
12the only incentives that remain to be veried are those of a last loser who, when on
the path, needs to decide on whether to take the good or not. The arguments from
the proof of Theorem 1 establish that it is optimal for him to take it if and only if
his valuation is at least ().
The condition c  ve
2 is satised for a large family of distributions. McAfee and
McMillan [10] showed that it is satised if F has an increasing hazard rate. In
addition, as the following lemma shows, it is satised if its expectation, ve, is at least
1
2 (more generally, one half of the maximal valuation).
Lemma 2. Let F be a distribution on [0;1] such that ve  1
2. Then ve
2  c.
Proof. It is well-known that in a general standard auction with n symmetric bidders
c =
R 1
0 [1   F(t)]F(t)n 1dt (see Riley and Samuelson [14]). For n = 2 this expression
equals
R 1
0 [1   F(t)]F(t)dt, and since the function (1 x)x is maximized at x = 1
2 we
have that c  1
4, which in turn is smaller than ve
2 by assumption.
Hence we have:
Corollary 1. Consider the general symmetric IPV repeated auction. Suppose that
either (i) ve  1
2 or (ii)
f
1 F is weakly increasing. Then there exists a   2 [0;1)
such that for all  2 [ ;1) there exists a PBE that implements EBR. Moreover, if the
auction format is second-price, then   = 0.
The conditions in Corollary 1 are sucient for EBR to be sustainable in equilibrium,
but they are not necessary. For example, if the distribution of valuation is F(t) = t,
where  2 (0; 1
2) and close to 1
2, then c > ve
2 and
f
1 F is not monotonic, but EBR
can nevertheless be implemented by Nash reversion, because its payo exceeds c.
3.1 Properties of EBR
For the sake of formulating several of the following results, the following will be
useful: call a collusive scheme an -scheme if it obeys Denition 1, but where 
13does not necessarily equal (). Looking at the class of -schemes, a question that
arises naturally is what is the optimal . Intuitively, one would expect it to equal the
expectation, ve. This intuition is correct, and is easily proved below.
Proposition 1. The ve-scheme has the maximal value among all -schemes.
Proof. Maximizing the expression in equation (3), the rst-order condition is  f()+
f()ve = 0, so  = ve. It is easy to see that the second-order condition is also satis-
ed.
The optimality of the ve-scheme is illustrated in the following ctitious scenario.
Suppose that the cartel is owned by a single agent, who instructs its subordinates
how to bid in each round. Suppose further that prior to sending his instructions he
only gets to observe the valuation of the previous round loser. It is clear that the
optimal policy for this agent is to allocate the good to this last loser, if and only
if his valuation is above ve. With this result at hand, we may further ask whether
there exist discount factors and distribution functions for which () = ve. The
following proposition shows that this is never the case: EBR always does worse than
the rst-best -scheme.
Proposition 2. For every distribution of valuation F and every discount factor  2
[0;1), () < ve.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that ()  ve for some F and . Then, equation
(5) implies ve[1 +    2F(())]  [ve  
R ()
0 tf(t)dt   F(())ve], which, upon
rearranging, becomes ve[1   F(())]   
R ()
0 tf(t)dt, a contradiction.
For the particular case  = (1), the fact stated in Proposition 2 can be seen in the
following alternative way. Combining equations (3) and (5) gives that the average
per-period payo of EBR when  ! 1 is:
14F()v
e + (1   F()); (6)
where  = (1). Then,   ve implies that the average per-period payo for each
bidder is weakly greater than ve, which is of course impossible.
Another intuitive property one would expect is the monotonicity of , because
patient bidders have higher willingness to substitute current goods for continuation
payos, relatively to impatient bidders. The following proposition shows this formally.
Proposition 3. The function  is strictly increasing in .
Proof. Multiplying both sides of equation (5) by [1 +    2F(())] and taking
derivative with respect to  gives:
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By Proposition 2 the term (ve ()) is positive, hence the expression on the brackets
is positive. Therefore, 0() > 0.
Lemma 3. (1) < ve
2 .









15Combining Propositions 1 through 3 together with the continuity of the payo func-
tion and Lemma 3 gives:
Corollary 2. The EBR payos are bounded away from the rst-best -scheme pay-
os, uniformly across .
Another natural relationship to investigate is the one between the threshold  and
the probability of an ecient allocation in a given auction. Letting Q() denote the
probability that the good will end up in the hands of the bidder who values it the
most under the -scheme, one might think that the optimal -scheme is the one whose
 maximizes Q. That is, that \maximizing selection" is equivalent to \maximizing
value" (within the class of -schemes). This equivalence holds if the distribution of
valuations is symmetric, but not in general.
Proposition 4. The probability Q is maximized at the median; i.e., if  maximizes
Q, then F() = 1
2.




















Solving for the integrals gives  log(1   F()) =  logF() ) F() = 1
2.
It may look surprising that the  that maximizes ecient selection does not, in
general, equals the one that maximizes the scheme's value. A moment's reection,
however, reveals why this is the case. The two 's correspond to dierent optimiza-
tion problems: the problem of \maximizing ecient selection" is dened in terms
of the stage game, while the value-maximization problem is dened for the repeated
game.
To see why the  that maximizes eciency is such that F() = 1
2, consider the
following ctitious scenario. Suppose that the last winner is bidding 0 independent of
his valuation, and the last loser is free to do whatever he wants. Suppose further that
his objective is to maximize ecient selection. That is, his payo function is    t,
16where t is his payment to the seller and  = 1 if the (ex post) allocation is ecient
and  = 0 otherwise. Then, he will play a threshold-strategy for some threshold .
Furthermore, at this threshold  he is exactly indierent between participation and
abstention, the indierence condition being F() = 1   F(), or F() = 1
2.
To see that the  that maximizes value need not satisfy F() = 1
2, consider a dis-
tribution such that F(ve) > 1
2. Suppose that the last loser draws a value v 2 (0;ve),
where 0 satises F(0) = 1
2. In this case, rejecting the good is desirable despite the
fact that it increases the probability of ineciency in the current period, because ac-
ceptance would imply acceptance in this range of values in all future periods, which,
in turn, translates to a lower-than-optimal value.
3.2 Example: The Uniform Case
In order to assess the EBR payo, it is helpful to look at some numbers. Suppose that
F is uniform and that  is close to 1. In this case, the competitive and bid rotation
payos are 0:1666 and 0:25, respectively. Aoyagi [1] derives an interesting variant of
bid rotation, dynamic bid rotation, where the bidders communicate their valuations
in every round, and based on their reports a single designated participant for the
auction is selected. The payo from this scheme in the uniform case is approximately
0:288. The exclusion scheme of Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn gives a payo of 0:276.
The EBR payo is higher than all of the above, 0:295.16 The rst-best payo is 0:333,
and the one of the optimal chips mechanism is 0:305.
4 Closing comments
EBR is very simple: it involves only pure strategies, no communication, no transfers,
no public randomizations, and it can be applied even if the bidders have bounded
16There is no claim here that EBR is better than the above-mentioned schemes in some absolute
sense. For example, Aoyagi's dynamic bid rotation, as opposed to EBR, allows for correlated types.
17(and very short) memory. Furthermore, it is robust to modications of the auctions'
monitoring technology; for example, in the case of a repeated second-price auction,
EBR can be implemented in a PBE even if there is no public information whatsoever:
that is, if all that a bidder knows is his own history of valuations, actions, and wins,
and nothing is announced by the seller.17
Though it is dened for a continuous distribution, EBR has an obvious analog
in a two-type model: when types are binary, the last loser is instructed to take the
good if and only if his current valuation is high. Consequently, the scheme delivers
the rst-best when there are only two types.18 Given any binary distribution, this
two-type-EBR scheme is implementable in PBE when the bidders are suciently
patient.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: By equations (1) and (2), (4) can be rewritten as:
 = 
R 1
 tf(t)dt   F()ve
1 +    2F()
For a xed , let ()  
R 1
 tf(t)dt F()ve
1+ 2F() and let  ()  ()   . The function
 : [0;1] ! R is continuous with  (0) = ve
1+ > 0 and  (1) =   ve
1    1 < 0. By
the mean value theorem, there exists an () 2 (0;1) such that  (()) = 0. To
prove uniqueness, it is sucient to show d
d < 1. The derivative d
d is given by
the following expression:
17Dening and dealing with private monitoring results in much heavier notation, which, in turn,
does not translate to substantial gain in insights. An interested reader may contact the author for
details regarding the implementability of EBR under private monitoring.
18Related results have been obtained by Athey and Bagwell [3], [4] and H orner and Jamison [8]
for a repeated Bertrand game.
18f[ f()   f()ve][1 +    2F()] + 2f()[(1   F())ve  
R 
0 tf(t)dt]g
[1 +    2F()]2 (8)
Clearly, the desired inequality holds if the numerator in (8) is negative. If it is positive,
then it is sucient to establish:
[ f()   f()v
e][1 +    2F()] + 2f()(1   F())v




e < [1 +    2F()][1 +    2F() + f() + f()v
e]
For the latter, it is sucient to establish 2f()(1 F())ve < [1+ 2F()]f()ve,
which holds because  < 1.
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